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COMMENTS
LET THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME:
SHOULD COURTS EXERCISE THE POWER
OF APPELLATE SENTENCE REVIEW IN
CASES INVOLVING NARCOTICS AND
OTHER STIGMATIZED CRIMES?
LEE DIONNE*
Traditionally, appellate courts defer to criminal sentences within the
statutory range established by the legislature for a particular offense.
Throughout most of U.S. history, this deferral reflected the fact-finding role
played by the trial judge who crafted the sentence. However, the
legislature's role in determining sentence ranges requires rethinking the
issue of substantive appellate sentence review. In a political climate that is
"tough on crime," legislatures continue to ramp up criminal penalties for
newsworthy crimes such as narcotics violations, with the result that prison
populations, and the taxpayer's bill, have skyrocketed. Appellate courts
should exercise greater review powers in a democratically responsible way
in order to curtail certain excessive sentences. To this end, this Comment
recommends a framework to identify suitable cases for substantive sentence
review. First, the appellate court should determine whether the crime has
been politicized, such that the crime can be described as stigmatic. If so,
the appellate court should then inquire as to whether the sentence is
excessive. Under this proposal, a sentence is excessive if it is more severe
than that imposed for crimes of similar moral gravity. Finally, if a sentence
is excessive, it should be judicially edited to reflect culpability, grounded by
a desire to match the sentence to those imposed for morally equivalent
offenses in the jurisdiction.
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009; M.A., California
State University San Bernardino, 2006; B.A., UC Riverside, 2004.
LEE DIONNE
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional rule under the common law is that an appellate court
may not review a sentence that the trial court has imposed if it is within
statutory guidelines.' Since the legislature establishes narcotics laws, this
rule effectively leaves the question of proportionate punishment for
narcotics violations within the purview of politicians.2 In the context of the
War on Drugs and a political climate bent on being "tough on crime,"
which incentivizes greater penalties for certain criminal offenses, the
political element removes the query as to whether a penalty is proportionate
and replaces it with an imperative to ramp up penalties.3
However, there is a small but growing trend to move away from strict
application of the common law rule, even where the statute does not
authorize appellate sentence review.4 Nor is this a new trend, as the case
law demonstrates. A generation ago, in People v. Thomas, an appellate
court held that a state statute prescribing a sentence of fifteen years without
the possibility of parole for a third felony drug conviction violated
California's constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment.5 Courts that depart from the common law rule discuss
amorphous standards such as "shockingly disproportionate" and "clear
abuse of discretion," and may resort to comparing the penalties for offences
of similar gravity in making their determination.6
There has been much professional and academic discussion about
sentencing guidelines fueled by the strong concern that drug sentences may
1 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1997).
2 See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1030 (2005) ("The New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized that such prosecutorial power [as granted by statute] over mandatory minimum
sentences, combined with statutory restrictions on judicial sentencing power, created a
regulatory imbalance.").
3 See, e.g., Greg Rogers, Criminal Sentencing in Colorado: Ripe for Reform, 65 U.
COLO. L. REv. 685, 690 (1994) (attributing the rise in prison expenditures and populations to
a "tough on crime" attitude). Rogers argues that the rise in prison populations in the state
between the early 1980s and 1995 was directly caused by an increase in the average stay of
an inmate from twenty-two months to an estimated fifty-three months. Id.
4 Reitz, supra note 1, at 1447. Reitz highlights the fact that between 1972 and 1997, the
number of sentencing commissions increased from zero to twenty.
5 119 Cal. Rptr. 739, 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
6 See, e.g., State v. Fischer, 498 P.2d 147, 148 (Ariz. 1972) (defining the standard as
"clear abuse of discretion"); In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Cal. 1974) (comparing and
contrasting penalties for similar or graver crimes); Ruhm v. State, 496 P.2d 809, 816 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1972) (characterizing the standard as "shocks the conscience of the Court").
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be overly harsh.7  The conflict may be characterized as majoritarian
(legislatures passing popular crime laws) versus counter-majoritarian
(judges challenging legislative power to achieve what they consider fairer
results).8 In short, this Comment argues that the movement away from the
common law in sentencing for narcotics and other stigmatic crimes signals
judicial dissatisfaction with legislative decision-making, and represents a
form of institutional protest, the continued and expanded efforts of which
may play a major role in achieving a rational drug criminal policy.
This discussion also concerns itself with the implications of expanding
the role of appellate sentence review. Insofar as a greater role for the courts
comes at the expense of a lesser role for the legislatures, certain separation
of powers questions arise that must be addressed in a government of checks
and balances, namely: (1) Is legislative power weakened
unconstitutionally?; (2) Do the courts possess manageable standards by
which to assess the appropriateness of sentences?; (3) Does a greater role
for the courts in this area cause legitimate concern about a slippery slope in
criminal cases where sentences have not generally been thought excessive?;
and (4) Given the importance of criminal sentences as a badge of societal
opprobrium, does appellate sentence review unfairly deprive the citizenry of
its voice in making public its disapproval of conduct?
These difficult questions rarely square up with easy solutions in the
form of bright-line rules. For those who subscribe to a formal
understanding of the separation of powers, the practice of appellate
sentence review may be fairly characterized as a usurpation of democratic
power.9 For others, more concerned with the functional aspects of a
government of checks and balances, the current lack of incentive for the
legislature to act highlights a breach in effective government, calling for an
effective solution or at least a means to such a solution. 10
7 David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in American Criminal
Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 458 (2001) (noting that no other Western nation regularly
imposes sentences of more than two years, and that "[tihe disparities between the United
States and other industrialized nations are greatest with respect to ... drug crimes"); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist
Framework, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 261, 269 (2007) (arguing that the growth of both
the prison population overall, and its racial disparity, are significantly attributable to
aggressive street-level enforcement of drug laws and harsh sentencing of drug offenders).
8 See, e.g., Melissa T. Aoyagi, Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dialogue
on International Drug Policy, 37 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 555, 555 (2005) ("[T]he global
war on drugs is now causing more harm than drug abuse itself.").
9 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 219 (2000) (observing that the mechanism of judicial review is at
odds with the republican ideas permeating the founding of the United States).
10 Matthew James Tanielian, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court:
One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 961, 986 (1991) (defining functional
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This Comment would place appellate sentence review as a tool that
lies permissibly within the judiciary's power, one that serves the tandem
purposes of communicating dissatisfaction to the affected branch and
correcting for circumstances not foreseen by this branch. Such review must
be selectively employed in a category of cases sharing certain specific
characteristics, namely, so-called stigmatic crimes." Stigmatic crimes are
certain politicized crimes that a legislature compromised by a "tough on
crime" culture is ill-suited to address in a rational and cost-effective
manner.
This Comment is divided into three parts. Part II discusses the role of
the common law in limiting the historic use of appellate sentence review
and situates such review powers as judicial in nature. Part III assesses
narcotic sentencing in the United States, including the history, costs,
attitudes of different constituencies, and reasons why legislative solutions
are unlikely. Part IV advocates a framework for the application of sentence
review powers as the most workable solution and responds to certain
anticipated arguments against review powers, including the view that such
powers impermissibly conflict with the role of the legislature.
II. APPELLATE REVIEW
A. THE COMMON LAW RULE FORBIDDING APPELLATE SENTENCE
REVIEW
The common law rule holds that an appellate court should not review a
sentence where the governing statute specifies that sentence for the relevant
offense. 12 What are the rationales behind the adoption of this rule? In what
order of importance do courts view them? How can they be logically
organized? The discussion to follow addresses these questions in an
attempt to frame the common law rule in terms of its costs and benefits.
Though utility should rarely be the sole basis for evaluation, it provides us
separation of powers doctrine as "call[ing] for a system of practical checks and balances so
as to maintain a continuing and evolving separation of powers").
11 See, e.g., Regina Austin, "The Shame of It All": Stigma and the Political
Disenfranchisement of Formerly Convicted and Incarcerated Persons, 36 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 173, 180-81 (2004) (observing that the stigmatic effect of conviction affects
other individuals in the offender's life, including children); Nora V. Demleitner, "Collateral
Damage": No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027, 1033-34 (2002) (noting
that criminal and secondary sanctions, such as de jure disqualification for government
benefits or disenfranchisement, marginalize drug offenders, hampering their reintegration
efforts and increasing the likelihood of recidivism).
12 See, e.g., Ruhm v. State, 496 P.2d 809, 816 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (citing well-
settled law that "where the verdict imposed is within the limits of punishment fixed by the
Legislature ... the jury verdict should not be disturbed").
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with a starting point for better understanding the normative principles and
values at stake.
Administrative convenience may be the consequence that justifies the
common law rule in fact. 13 The judiciary in the United States has long
adhered to a strong doctrine of finality, one that emphasizes the firmness of
decisions and reveals institutional discomfort with revisiting issues where a
trial judge had to make a decision on the spot or on the basis of conflicting
or inadequate evidence. 14 Great deference to the findings of juries and the
discretion of trial judges embodies the rule.
In the common law system, where judges consistently applied
considerable discretion in the sentencing of defendants, the refusal to apply
appellate review to criminal sentences made sense as a reflection of the trial
court's fact-finding role and the discretion available to judges to adjust
sentences to the facts of the case at hand. There can be little doubt that
nearly every defendant would appeal their sentence under a countervailing
system and consume great resources in the process, often with little
prospect of a different result. From this perspective, the common law rule
is an efficiency restraint that the judiciary imposed on itself.
An alternative rationale for the rule, and probably the more appealing
one instinctively, is that it preserves the separation of powers and advances
democracy. 15 The separation of powers argument posits that the imposition
of criminal sentences in a given case, and the power to define the
parameters of such a sentence, are separate functions allocated to different
branches of government. 16  Courts impose sentences, but legislatures
determine the range of acceptable sentences. Therefore, if an appellate
court determines for itself that a sentence is excessive where the statute
allowed the sentence, the court's invalidation constitutes an improper taking
13 Cf Reitz, supra note 1, at 1445-46 (discussing the administrative convenience
rationale for the rule, although placing less emphasis on it in light of other reasons for the
rule, such as a lack of substantive sentencing law and the fact that trial courts had no
obligation to explain the sentence imposed).
14 See, e.g., id. at 1445.
15 Pamela L. Bailey, Harmelin v. Michigan: Is the Eighth Amendment's Proportionality
Guarantee Left an Empty Shell?, 24 PAC. L.J. 221, 232-33 (1992) ("Deference to the
judgment of the legislature, and the early absence of clearly defined criteria to guide a
review of proportionality contributed to this judicial restraint" in exercising criminal
sentence review powers.).
16 See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the
Decisionmaker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1126-27 (1992). The
authors note that "[c]ompeting positions in the sentencing debate often reduce to one writer's
preference for one decisionmaker[, legislative versus judicial,] over another ... [and]
legislators often prefer legislatures." Id.
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of legislative authority.17 The argument for democracy continues thusly:
the legislature represents the will of the people; therefore, any frustration of
the legislative will constitutes an affront to democratic decision-making. 8
The legislature here is a proxy for "the people."
From this angle, the common law rule was generated by the need of
the legislature to control the courts, whose counter-majoritarian interests
interfere with democracy. But this viewpoint is flawed primarily because it
falsely equates the lawmaking function of the legislature with the review
power of an appellate court. 19 The legislature creates a law that proscribes
prohibited conduct and determines consequences to be applied in a range of
anticipated and unanticipated factual scenarios. 20  Appellate sentence
review is tied to the facts of a specific case and need not invalidate a statute,
short of a constitutional finding that a law is per se invalid. That the statute
continues to have the same proscriptive effect on future conduct is a
testament to the power of the legislature.
A second problem with viewing the rule as a restraint imposed by the
legislature is that, after all, the rule is rooted in the common law-judge-
made law. The lack of codification by the legislature detracts from the
separation of powers argument. 21 That is not to say that courts did not
impose the rule on themselves, at least in part, for such reasons. However,
the rule may best be understood as judicial in origin, and subject to
alteration by that same judiciary. The American Law Institute reached the
same conclusion, recommending that criminal sentences be open to
appellate review as part of any rational crime policy.
22
17 See, e.g., Corey A. Johanningmeier, Note, Law & Politics: The Case Against Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 82 IND. L.J. 1125, 1126 (2007) ("[L]egal scholars opposing
judicial review... [distinguish] between unelected courts and more democratic
representative legislatures.").
18 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006) (arguing that "judicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a
mode of final decisionmaking in a free and democratic society").
19 See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1111
(2000) (characterizing the pro-legislature attitude as "assum[ing] that the Constitution
prefers ordinary law-making by accountable legislatures over prevention of ordinary law-
making by judges exercising judicial review" (footnote omitted)).
20 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
885, 928 (2004) ("[C]ases involving unusual facts ... raise questions the legislature likely
failed to anticipate. Such disputes are probably inevitable... given the limitations of
language .... ).
21 See Reitz, supra note 1, at 1444. Reitz observes that even where the courts recognized
the power of appellate sentence review, they largely refrained from exercising it. This fact
suggests a custom of deference to the legislature, but not a binding rule.
22 AM. BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 3 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter AM.
BAR ASS'N PROJECT].
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B. INNOVATIONS ON AND DEROGATIONS FROM THE COMMON LAW
RULE
In the 1970s, the appellate system in California handed down a
significant ruling asserting that deference regarding sentencing was not an
unassailable obligation of the court. In People v. Thomas,23 the defendant,
Melvin Braxton Thomas, was a drug offender whom the court sentenced to
fifteen years without the possibility of parole under the terms of the relevant
narcotics statute.24 The issue on appeal was whether the legislature's denial
to the defendant of the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the state constitution.25
Though the court's opinion does not identify the state's arguments on
the matter, the state likely argued that the legislature's democratic process
precluded a finding that the sentence constituted cruel or unusual
punishment. Central to this argument is the idea that where standards lack
clear objective criteria, such as the line demarking cruelty from just
punishment, the will of the people, rather than executive or judicial
bureaucrats, should determine the necessarily arbitrary boundaries.26 This
point further assumes that the legislature represents popular will and the
judiciary represents an instrument that frustrates that will.27  This is an
assumption that this Comment will revisit, and challenge, in Part III.
However, criminal sentences are, or can be, subjected to a principled
test of proportionality under the cruel and unusual punishment doctrine.28
Under this approach, the court would be free to find any sentence excessive
where the court felt that such a sentence was out of proportion to the nature
of the offense.29 While the Thomas opinion kept silent as to the criteria
23 119 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
24 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350 (West 1973).
25 Thomas, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 760.
26 See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007)
("Democratic legitimacy can come only from freely given popular consent expressed
through an elected legislature.").
27 See, e.g., Johanningmeier, supra note 17, at 1126 (referring to "judicial review-
and... the associated concept of a legal aristocracy"); Waldron, supra note 18, at 1395
(noting that "[judges'] credentials are not remotely competitive with the democratic
credentials of elected legislators").
28 See Anthony A. Avey, Casenote, Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 539, 546 (1993) (noting the second prong of the test is whether a punishment is
"grossly out of proportion to the crime committed" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29 Federal courts can expect greater difficulty than state courts in applying
proportionality review. See Stephen T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality: A New Perspective
on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 55 (2000) (noting that
the Supreme Court "chastised the Fourth Circuit for overturning" on proportionality grounds
a forty-year sentence for possession of a "small amount of marijuana").
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consulted in measuring the nature of an offense, it strongly implicated
normative notions of fairness in ruling for the defendant.
By reference to In re Foss, the court compared the penalty to those the
legislature had assigned to "more serious crimes," both in California and in
other jurisdictions.30 In making the leap from this comparison to the
conclusion that the sentence was excessive, the court must have assumed
that drug offenses are not, in and of themselves, comparable in terms of
gravity to these other violent offenses.31 In Part III, this Comment will
debate the issue of whether court determinations of an offense's gravity
always, never, or sometimes violate the principles of limited government.
While decisions similar in result to this California case are rare,
32
many cases do adopt, at least by implication, the Thomas court's reasoning
when asserting their authority to review statutory criminal sentences.
Freely acknowledging that result-driven cases assert themselves most
forcefully, we must not forget the important role played by the assertion of
the right to review.33 The right to review necessarily implicates the
authority to apply standards of review. It is a standard of judicial
abdication, rather than of review, to defer automatically to the actions of the
reviewed parties.
30 Thomas, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 752 (citing In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1076 n.3 (Cal. 1974)).
In In re Foss, the court concluded that the lack of parole provision in the California statute
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in part because the penalties exceeded those
assigned to more serious offenses in California and other jurisdictions. Foss, 519 P.2d at
1078-79.
31 Foss, 519 P.2d at 1081 ("A compulsory prison sentence of 20 years for a non-violent
crime imposed without consideration for defendant's individual personality and history is so
excessive that it 'shocks the conscience."' (quoting People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827,
834 (Mich. 1972)).
32 See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding that a Los
Angeles statute criminalizing narcotics addiction violated the Fourteenth Amendment
because the law punished status); People v. Thomas, 116 Cal. Rptr. 393, 400-01 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974) (holding that a sentence of six months to life for assault with a deadly weapon
constituted cruel and unusual punishment because the maximum sentence for trying to kill
the victim would have been fourteen years; other violent crimes also received lower
punishments: kidnapping (one to twenty-five years); assault with intent to injure or disfigure
(one to fourteen years); dismemberment (one to fourteen years)).
33 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173 (1803) (exercising judicial review powers,
the Supreme Court invalidated its own jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1793, which
the Court determined to be unconstitutional). Marshall asserted review powers in a
politically safe way because the result of the case appeased the Jefferson Administration.
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S.
Constitutional Practice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine
Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1483, 1547 (1997) (discussing "the political
circumstances Chief Justice Marshall faced" in the Marbury case).
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In surveying cases derogating from the common law rule, one frequent
theme is the courts' constant, although unstated, hesitancy to contradict the
legislature blatantly, or to propose a framework by which criminal
sentences would be reconsidered wholesale by the judiciary.34 This
reluctance suggests that advocates for the common law rule overstate the
threat of judicial encroachment on legislative turf.35  Another point of
interest is the simple question: why assert the power at all? What reason
would a court have to assert the authority of appellate review in a case
where such an assertion will not alter the ultimate outcome?
The cynical attitude that all entities seek to aggrandize their power is
an inadequate explication, because it fails to address the unique context of
these decisions. This Comment proposes that courts in the last generation
or so perceive a growing problem-the legislature's proliferation of heavy-
handed sentences in the pursuit of reelection-and that courts foresee a
future where this problem could become so severe that the power of
appellate sentence review will be critical in cases where it has not been thus
far.
III. NARCOTIC SENTENCING
A. MODERN HISTORY OF NARCOTIC SENTENCES: THE POLITICAL
ANGLE
In the American system, judges enjoyed great latitude in the
determination of criminal sentences until the second half of the twentieth
century, with its dramatic increase in scope of the federal government's
involvement in the daily lives of citizens.36 The expansion of the federal
government coincided with intense social conflict as the nation struggled to
34 See People v. Marshall, 629 N.E.2d 64, 73 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993) (requiring a showing
that the sentence was a clear abuse of discretion); People v. Alvarado, 504 N.Y.S.2d 825,
826 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that modifying the sentence is appropriate only in
extraordinary circumstances). But cf McLaughlin v. Minnesota, 190 N.W.2d 867, 872
(Minn. Ct. App. 1971) (indicating appropriate sentence review where the sentence exceeds
bounds of justice and humanity).
35 But cf Wilson Ray Huhn, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Sandra Day 0 'Connor:
A Refusal to "Foreclose the Unanticipated," 39 AKRON L. REV. 373, 387-89 (2006) (arguing
that, at least in the Supreme Court context, the Justices tend to have expanded their power of
review beyond the holding of Marbury, 5 U.S. at 173). However, as Huhn himself points
out, id. at 387-89, the Court has pushed review powers into some arenas, such as state
legislation, more than others, like state criminal laws. One consequence of the ideological
dichotomy between the antagonists and the proponents of judicial review is the
oversimplification of the debate. When the issue should be whether judicial review is
appropriate and advantageous in a particular context, the argument devolves into whether
review powers should exist at all.
36 Reitz, supra note 1, at 1445.
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define itself in the midst of the Cold War.37 Dissidents and protesters
became associated in the media with use of narcotics, and the ensuing
debate over narcotics then took on a political scope: narcotics did not
simply undermine individual lives, they undermined an entire way of life.
38
In this rhetorical framework, with narcotic use tantamount to an issue of
national security, state and federal legislation targeted illegal narcotic use
and a host of associated activities. 39 The legislation was aimed not so much
at curbing detrimental conduct as it was at reassuring a troubled voting
public that the government would clamp down on social upheaval.40
Political desire to reassure the public quickly grew into a competition
that was so completely unrelated to the goal of actual deterrence that it. .,,41
quickly achieved a staggering degree of "overdeterrence. I refer to
overdeterrence not in the sense that politicians eradicated the problem at
inefficient cost, but rather in the sense that the incredible penalties were
inefficient because they had too little effect on conduct. If increasing
narcotics penalties would solve the narcotics issue-by making a rational
decision-maker adjust for the increased risk of life-shattering punishment
such that the decision to use drugs becomes irrational-then one would
expect the incarceration of drug offenders would remain constant (if the
amount of deterrence was perfectly efficient), or else decrease until
equilibrium.
But the story of the War on Drugs is exactly the opposite-
skyrocketing prison populations and skyrocketing black market economies
arose, both built around trafficking in and use of narcotics. 42  Two
37 See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 470 (2007) (noting the aggregate effect on society of the
Vietnam War, Civil Rights movement, violent riots, and civil protests).
38 Id. at 470-71 (observing that conservative Americans "thought that defiant displays of
civil disobedience threatened social order and were encouraged by the meek response of law
enforcement").
39 Carole Shapiro, Law v. Laughter: The War Against the Evil Weed and Big Screen
Reefer Sanity, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 795, 817 (2004).
40 Id.
41 Brooke A. Levy, Comment, When Cute Acronyms Happen to Bad Legislation: The
Reducing Americans' Vulnerability to Ecstasy "Rave" Act, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1251, 1265
(2004) ("[Pleople think that they can [just] stop drug traffic by putting people in jail and by
having terribly long sentences. But, of course, it doesn't do any good." (quoting Senior
Judge Whitman Knapp, J., Southern District of New York)). Evidence further shows no
effects in reducing the influx of narcotics or incidences of drug crime. Id.
42 See, e.g., Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Aftershocks of
a "Tough on Crime" Philosophy, 93 Ky. L.J. 305, 309 (2004) ("America has increased its
incarceration rate 500% [between 1973 and 1997], it has 5% of the world's population but
25% of its prisoners.., and no one argues that America has made great progress in
controlling crime .... ).
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important observations follow. First, the legislative arsenal for combating
illegal drugs-increasing criminal sentences-has failed in pragmatic
terms, even if its advocates would claim a moral victory. Second, if we
recognize that the assessment of government policies needs a reasonable
rudder, we can use economic analysis-insofar as it investigates the
conduct of rational actors-to ground analysis of legislative measures and
to propose principled frameworks for the courts to apply when reviewing
criminal sentences in an appellate capacity.
B. COST OF NARCOTIC SENTENCES
Understandably, a rational citizen could conclude that drug offenders
"deserve" their sentences as a result of their immoral conduct and that
complaints about the narcotic sentencing regime are, at best, misdirected
sympathy, or, at worst, backdoor legalization efforts.43 After all, narcotics
are the centerpiece of a multi-billion-dollar black market in the United
States.4 That black market regulates itself through networks of crime and
violence that destroy lives and undermine communities. 4 ' These social ills
are said to justify hard sentences for even simple possession of narcotics.
And if hard sentences effectively combat the drug economy, then this
approach would make perfect sense.4 6
43 John T. Schuler & Arthur McBride, Notes from the Front: A Dissident Law-
Enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 931 (1990)
(summarizing the view that drug users are punished not so much for their culpability in using
drugs, but for their potential culpability in the introduction of non-users to drug culture).
44 ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE AMERICAN
BLACK MARKET 14 (2004).
45 Richard Curtis, The Improbable Transformation of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime,
Violence, Drugs, and Youth in the 1990s, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1240 (1998)
("Drugs were also said to deplete a neighborhood's human capital by ruining once-promising
lives and forcing productive members of the community to move elsewhere.").
46 But cf George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders'
Views of the New York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1217, 1218-19 (1998)
(endorsing the "broken windows" metaphor, which posits that aggregate crime increases as a
result of police neglect of minor offenses, which the authors contend communicates social
apathy to would-be criminals). Kelling and Bratton argue that police efforts in targeting
minor or "victimless" crimes rather than economics account for the decline in crime in New
York City during the 1990s. Id. at 1217. As evidence, Kelling and Bratton cite
unemployment statistics to demonstrate that the economy was "hardly.. . booming." Id.
However, the unemployment statistics cited must be contrasted with the significantly higher
unemployment rate during the preceding recession generated, in part, by a massive rise in
taxes. E.J. McMahon, Tax-and-Spend, Boom-and-Bust: Lessons for Mayor Bloomberg, 23
Civic REP. 1 (2001) ("[In the early 1990s, Mayor] Dinkins ... tried to close the budget gap
primarily with added taxes. He succeeded only in fueling the destruction of 300,000 private
sector jobs .... ). In fact, after recovering from Dinkins's tax hike, the New York City
economy boomed in several boroughs other than Manhattan through the 1990s, including
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But they do not work. Instead, the narcotics industry in America
follows a "cycle of crime" model. Imagine a community with a well-
established drug economy. As the result of a systematic police campaign,
the key narcotic traffickers are arrested and subsequently convicted. Their
long sentences cost taxpayers billions of dollars per year.47 In the next
stage of the cycle, drug crime drops as the distributors reel. Yet the demand
remains high, and an opportunistic new generation steps into the gap,
allowing the drug trade to continue to flourish. The cycle then continues
with another raid, another round of convictions, and another round of
expensive sentences. Since the prison sentences are long, the subsequent
generations of prisoners overlap, imposing ever greater costs. And what is
achieved? 48  Some culpable persons are punished, but the problem is not
eliminated. The more time passes, the more generations imprisoned, the
greater the cost to society of maintaining some kind of equilibrium on this
insane hamster wheel.
This inefficiency matters because it exposes the nation to greater
crime, placing us and our property in intolerable peril. In a world of scarce
resources, when we devote resources to enforcing the narcotics criminal
regime, we necessarily choose not to apply them to some other end49 (say,
programs designed to prevent domestic violence) that might yield greater
returns in terms of reducing the number of crime victims.
The victimization of human beings that we could protect with our
current level of investment, but fail to because the money is spent
inefficiently, is a tragic and unnecessary cost to society as a whole. The
Queens. Michael L. Dolfman & Solidelle F. Wasser, 9/11 and the New York City Economy:
A Borough-by-Borough Analysis, 127 MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 2004, at 3, 13. The
correlation between economic growth and declining rates of crime undercuts Kelling's and
Bratton's assertion that primarily police factors effected the drop in inner-city crime.
47 Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 460 n.374 (1997) (referencing Jim Haner, The War on Drugs:
Unwinnable, Profligate, Corrupting, BALT. SUN, May 19, 1996, at 1E (revealing that since
1981, the United States has spent $65 billion on the War on Drugs movement-most of it on
anti-drug law enforcement-"without making so much as a dent in the supply, price or
general availability of illegal drugs")).
48 See Levy, supra note 41, at 1265 ("After decades of criminal prohibition and intensive
law enforcement efforts to rid the country of illegal drugs . . . , violent traffickers still
endanger life in our cities, a steady stream of drug offenders still pours into our jails and
prisons, and tons of cocaine, heroin and marijuana still cross our borders unimpeded."
(quoting ACLU, Drug Policy, available at http://www.aclu.org/DrugPolicy/DrugPolicy
Main.cfm (last visited Jan. 25, 2009)).
49 Schuler & McBride, supra note 43, at 932 ("If punishment is needed for robbery,
larceny, and child abuse, which we firmly believe that it is, let's not waste our time with
drug buyers. Regardless of whether or not America decides to decriminalize, resources
devoted to drug possession cases are wasted and will be wasted, unless we first make serious
inroads on violent, white collar and street-level crime.").
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problem is that when the strength of the black market drug economy tells us
that our massive investment of resources is netting no results, politicians
call out for us to throw even more money at the problem.50 And this is what
longer prison sentences and lofty incarceration rates are-investments of
taxpayer money.
This is not to say the government should stop allocating resources to
combating drug crime. But the government should be accountable for how
it goes about the job. Deterrence via harsh drug sentences has been the
principal tool in the arsenal. Common sense tells us that the length of
sentences exceeds their deterrent effect, since drug crimes are punished
more severely than crimes like assault and sexual abuse, but the drug
economy marches on, and society's incarceration costs fly through the roof.
Faced with such a nonsensical situation, it cannot be surprising that some
courts have reflected on the role they play in perpetuating the crisis.
C. ACADEMIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NARCOTIC SENTENCES
Scholars have wide-ranging views about the War on Drugs. While
some consider it a moral crusade, others consider it a public health and
safety issue. To still others, the War on Drugs is probably nothing more
than business as usual. Some claim that it may even increase drug
trafficking profits.51 To a growing degree, there is a view that the War on
Drugs is a "farce ' 2 of"gulag" proportions. 3
Legal scholars have criticized not only the lack of efficacy, but also the
moral consequences of approaching a domestic narcotics problem through
the rhetoric of war. 4 In framing the conflict in martial terms, the rhetorical
effect is to dehumanize one's enemies, in this case the friends or family
0 Id. at 919.
5 Id. at 933.
52 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies of
the H. Appropriations Comm., 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (forthcoming), available at LexisNexis
Federal News Service (statement of Representative Patrick Kennedy) ("And war on drugs is
just-it's a farce.").
53 Janeen Kerper, Trial Advocacy Lessons from Latin America, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 91, 96
(2001) ("Thanks to the War on Drugs and "Three Strikes" legislation, our prison-system now
incarcerates more people than at any time in history-rivaling apartheid South Africa and
the gulags of the former Soviet Union.").
54 See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 112-13 (1998) ("Our politicians speak casually of
enlisting the military, the National Guard, and the CIA to keep drugs away from the
Americans who seek them .... We routinely deploy.., massive numbers of federal and
state agents [in] military-style raids .... All of these changes, mostly unimaginable a
generation ago, are largely the products of twenty-five years of trying (and failing) to 'win'
the War on Drugs." (footnotes omitted)).
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members of a startling number of Americans.55 The act of dehumanizing
concurrently desensitizes the public to what could be wryly described as the
natural consequence of war-casualties. 5 6 Further, half a century of this
and similar rhetoric has so entrenched the view that drug offenders are sub-
human that politicians can rely on it when building tough-on-crime
campaigns.57
Critics also attack the War on Drugs because it is selectively waged
against minorities. 58 The effects on the African-American community have
been well-documented, 59 but the Latino, Pacific-Islander, and recent
immigrant communities have been affected as well. 60  Evidence for
selective application includes documentation of variable conviction rates
and sentence lengths for offenders by race and ethnicity.61 In addition,
there is widespread recognition that money from the middle and upper
classes is the true catalyst for the black market economy and its continued
55 See Kevin Freking, More Illegal Drug Usage Reported by Ages 50-59, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/09/
08/morejillegal-drug-usage reported-by-ages_50_59/ (reporting that twenty million
Americans use narcotics in any given month).
56 See Jill Soffiyah Elijah, Casualties of the War on Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13,
2002, at D 12.
57 See Schuler & McBride, supra note 43, at 930-31 (noting that a potential victim of
drug abuse ceases to be a sympathetic victim upon using drugs). The attitude these authors
discuss is not unlike that prevailing in a zombie film, whereby sympathetic characters lose
all humanity upon "infection." In the rhetoric of war, this wall of separation dividing users
from non-users cannot be questioned.
58 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why
the "War on Drugs" Was a "War on Blacks," 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381 (2002)
("Throughout the drug war, African Americans have been disproportionately investigated,
detained, searched, arrested and charged with the use, possession, and sale of illegal
drugs.").
59 See Elijah, supra note 56 ("African-Americans make up... nearly two-thirds of those
sent to state prison for drug offenses ... despite the fact that white drug users outnumber
African-Americans by more than 5 to 1."). Elijah quoted further statistics demonstrating that
African-Americans are thirty-three times more likely to receive a prison sentence for a drug
offense than whites. Id.
60 See, e.g., Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction: Racial Inequality,
Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 443, 443 (2001)
("In short, the drug war is 'just say no' to drugs by 'just say yes' to selective targeting of
African Americans and Latino/a Americans by law enforcement officials and the courts.").
61 Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996, 26
CRIME & JUST. 17, 22-23 (1999) (noting that minority convictions disproportionately drove
the increase in U.S. prison populations, with African American inmates increasing by 261%
and Hispanics increasing by 554%); Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, Ethnicity
Effects on Sentence Outcomes in Large Urban Courts: Comparisons Among White, Black,
and Hispanic Defendants, 85 Soc. SCi. Q. 994, 994 (2004) ("Both black and Hispanic
defendants tend to receive harsher sentences than white defendants. Also, ethnicity effects
are the largest in the sentencing of drug offenders ....").
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growth,62 and yet these demographic groups pay a disproportionately lower
penalty.63
Another significant criticism of the War on Drugs is the undermining
effect that it has on citizens' confidence in government. 64 A racially- and
socioeconomically-based crime policy generates conflicts that divide
society and erode respect for the rule of law.65 That makes it more difficult
both to discuss reasonable ways of dealing with the problem and to enforce
any decisions reached, since the primary vehicle for governmental action,
lawmaking, has lost credibility. Critics underscore the irony that the War
on Drugs has created greater social ills than it was intended to fight.
66
D. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD NARCOTIC SENTENCES AND CRIME
IN GENERAL
Popular attitudes with respect to the War on Drugs are more difficult
to decipher, since there are simply more of them and relatively few vehicles
for expressing them, short of opinion polls and the polling booth. In fact, a
thorough investigation of the various attitudes that different groups hold
with regards to narcotics and the War on Drugs would surely require a
book-length effort. The aim here is more modest, namely to survey the
extant statistics in order to highlight the fact that there is substantial
diversity when it comes to popular attitudes. This observation is significant
because the electoral game suggests a hegemonic voting trend in favor of
tough sentences. If the correlation between public attitudes and political
ones is not as compelling as first appears, then perhaps this goes some way
62 See SCHLOSSER, supra note 44, at 14 (noting that marijuana is the nation's most
valuable cash crop, worth perhaps $25 billion every year, and that most of it is grown in the
Midwest). This notable statistic strongly implies the broad appeal of the drug to individuals
with disposable income.
63 See Elijah, supra note 56 (noting that only 1% of white males between the ages of
twenty and thirty-nine are incarcerated, one-tenth the rate of incarceration for similarly
situated African-Americans).
64 This has occurred in large part because the public perceives broad corruption among
the law enforcement officers charged with waging the War on Drugs. See, e.g., David W.
Rasmussen & Bruce L. Benson, Rationalizing Drug Policy Under Federalism, 30 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 679, 709 n.121 (2003) ("[C]onsistent with systematic corrupt enforcement
practices," agents target novice rather than experienced smugglers.).
65 The statistics cited above compel the conclusion that the War on Drugs is a racially
and socioeconomically "two-faced" crime policy. An important consequence is that whites
are insulated from the horrors of the War on Drugs and, thus, feel less compelled to correct
the problem. The disproportionate voting power of insulated and affluent whites virtually
assures that the democratic process will fail to correct for the discrepancy, at least, unless the
policy were to be redirected toward all Americans.
66 See Schuler & McBride, supra note 43, at 895.
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toward dispelling the supposed justification for the War on Drugs, namely,
that the democratic will demands it.
67
The first reason to question the correlation between popular attitudes
and political reality is the recognition that not everyone votes. 68  Voter
turnout has traditionally been closely related to various factors including
race, socioeconomic status, education, wealth, and age.69 Older, wealthier,
better-educated persons tend to vote in disproportionate numbers compared
to those individuals living in the poor communities most affected by the
War on Drugs. 70 The disturbing lack of voter participation surely has less
to do with apathy-who could be apathetic when blighted by violence,
narcotics, and incarceration?-but with a sense of powerlessness as a voting
majority consistently affirms measures that in fact exacerbate the problem.
71
We can rely on more than common sense to demonstrate the absence
of apathy within the affected communities.72 Statistics show that issues of
67 Robert J. Blendon & John T. Young, The Public and the War on Illicit Drugs, 279 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 827, 827-32 (1998) (describing, among other popular views, the
widespread public perception that the War on Drugs has failed).
68 In fact, not everyone can vote, as many states expressly disenfranchise felons. See
Robert R. Preuhs, State Felon Disenfranchisement Policy, 82 Soc. Scl. Q. 733, 736 (2001)
(arguing generally that disenfranchisement policies serve to weaken minority voices in
political life because such policies affect minority communities so disproportionately).
69 Tony A. Blakely, Bruce P. Kennedy & Ichiro Kawachi, Socioeconomic Inequality in
Voting Participation and Self-Rated Health, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, January 2001, at 99
(referring to such categories as "social capital").
70 Cf Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1278 (1994) (contending that, under the "urban
frustration argument," urban minority communities welcome disproportionate penalties and
greater than usual police latitude in order to more effectively combat the blight of
neighborhood crime). The weakness of this argument is its lack of empirical support, as it
relies principally on a theory that public services respond to public demand, without
addressing the problem that "public demand" reflects some communities' demands more
than others. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement
and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1222
(2000).
71 See, e.g., Gerald Caplan, The Ethics of the "Unprofessional Profession," 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1698, 1704-05 (1990) (reviewing EDWIN J. DELATTRE, CHARACTER AND Cops: ETHICS
IN POLICING (1998)) ("To a few leaders, anti-drug war rhetoric by whites is not only
paternalistic but sinister. It camouflages a subtle campaign for reestablishing white
hegemony ... ").
72 Empirical evidence suggests that urban minorities distinguish between the police and
the legal system as a whole. According to a 2000 survey, African-Americans in the lowest
income bracket were twice as likely as higher-earning African-Americans to see the legal
system as "fair." However, in the same survey, lower-earning African-Americans tended to
describe the police as "just another gang." Brooks, supra note 70, at 1224. This seeming
contradiction may reflect poor urban communities' "dual frustration" with ubiquitous crime
and police misconduct. Id. at 1228. Further, these survey results are not necessarily
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crime and safety top the list of these citizens' priorities.73 However, these
statistics also manifest a growing consensus that the government policies
are pernicious, not merely ineffective.74 In some communities, this
dissatisfaction has been expressed through a revival of the doctrine of jury
nullification-whereby a jury refuses to apply the law in a given case where
the result would be inequitable.75
More common than jury nullification is a general unwillingness to
cooperate with law enforcement authorities.76 As a result, the panoply of
investigative techniques available to officers is reduced, often at the
expense of a satisfactory resolution of the case. This, in turn, seems likely
to yield greater inaccuracy and inequity, leading to greater community
mistrust and greater resulting police malfeasance.77
Other segments of the public do not regard the War on Drugs as a
monolithic battle. These citizens may favor carve-outs for various
substances or uses, or may reject incarceration as a solution over medical
treatment for drug abusers. 78 Many people feel that medicinal marijuana
should be exempted from the overall campaign.79 Others, including
economist Milton Friedman, contend that it is economically backward to
criminalize marijuana use. 80 Such a view adopts a cost-benefit mode of
analysis that some may find uncomfortable for what one might see as a
incompatible. It is entirely reasonable to favor greater enforcement of the law, but not by an
escalation of police action or expanded police discretion. Id. at 1224.
73 See Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug
Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 137, 145-55 (1997) (demonstrating that minority attitudes toward crime and narcotics
are often harsher than those of affluent whites).
74 Id. at 165.
75 Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995).
76 Id. at 717 n.214.
77 See Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1593, 1617
(2002) (discussing the increased efficiency of police departments where such departments
engage in greater outreach to community leaders).
78 See Lisa Rosenblum, Note, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1218 (2002) ("[W]e cannot beat the drug problem in our society by
locking up all of the drug offenders. Prevention of drug-related crime through
treatment... is the most effective means of preventing recidivism.").
79 See Shapiro, supra note 39, at 799.
80 Letter from Milton Friedman, Hoover Institute, et al. to George W. Bush, President of
the United States, available at http://www.prohibitioncosts.org/endorsers.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2009) (arguing that there could be a $14 billion swing between the present state of
affairs and one where marijuana is legal and taxed like tobacco and alcohol); see also




moral issue.81 Very few public voices call for a complete legalization of
narcotics, and all demographic groups view substance abuse as cause for
legitimate concern. In short, everyone takes the issue seriously.
We are left with a consensus that a narcotics problem exists, but-also
with a growing view that our current approach to solving the problem
requires at least tweaking and perhaps radical reform. The political
atmosphere confuses the matter because it suggests one solution only-
tougher sentences in tandem with greater efforts at police enforcement. It is
not surprising that, in the face of crisis, many rational citizens would prefer
doing something to doing nothing. But here our political leaders fail us,
since the "something" that they are doing may actually be making us worse
off.
82
E. WHY LEGISLATURES ARE UNLIKELY TO REDUCE NARCOTIC
SENTENCES
In some ways, perception matters more than reality. And there is a
perception in the public at large that we are in the midst of an escalating
crime epidemic.83 While the available data tell a different story, that story
does not grab headlines or sell newspapers. 84 The meteoric rise in media
attention given to violent crimes generates nightly hysteria until it becomes
a trite and unchallenged fact of life.85 Thus, a new litmus test for politicians
has evolved: are you tough on crime?
86
81 See, e.g., Timothy P. Ward, Note, Needing a Fix: Congress Should Amend the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to Remove a Record of Addiction as a Protected
Disability, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 683, 702 (2005) (advocating condemnation of drug addicts
along the typical line that "[i]f addiction is essentially a choice.., it is appropriate to attach
to it a moral judgment").
82 See, e.g., Kathleen R. Sandy, The Discrimination Inherent in America's Drug War:
Hidden Racism Revealed by Examining the Hysteria over Crack, 54 ALASKA L. REv. 665,
665-67 (2003) (citing statistics that indicate that the War on Drugs has been completely
ineffective in regulating the supply of narcotics and has in fact targeted mere possessors of
narcotics, who represent 81% of drug war arrests).
83 See, e.g., Dean G. Rojek, Book Review, 31 CONTEMP. SOC. 87 (2002) (reviewing
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (2000)).
84 Monya M. Bunch, Comment, Juvenile Transfer Proceedings: A Place for Restorative
Justice Values, 47 How. L.J. 909, 926 (2002) ("In spite of increased media attention, violent
crime by juveniles is the lowest it has been in the past two decades.").
85 Shawn Monterastelli, Using Law and Law Enforcement to Prevent Violence and
Promote Community Vibrancy Near Bars, Clubs, and Taverns, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PuB. POL'Y 239, 241 (2004) ("[R]eporters must choose which crime events to cover. The
seriousness of the crime is an important standard .... The story may be even more
newsworthy because of its rarity .... Consequently, violent crimes receive higher ratings
[public perceptions of priority] ... in both perceived seriousness and perceived risk.").
86 See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467,
1488 (2001) ("The ever-present need to appear 'tough on crime' encourages legislators to
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The only permissible answer is yes. Yes is the only way to avoid
becoming an unsalvageable sound-bite. Yes is also the only way to remain
in the running for police, firemen, and parenting group endorsements,
which can often play a decisive role in local and state politics. 87 Yes allows
a politician to build credibility and to achieve an appealing crusader public
image. Who does it hurt, anyway? Not the bulk of likely voters.88 The
politicians need not take account of the cost of saying yes precisely because
the most affected communities do not turn out to vote in proportionate
numbers. 89  There would appear to be no benefit to a politician in
responding any differently, short of a supposed benefit for being
unorthodox, perhaps-a desperate gamble, to be sure.
Furthermore, because the War on Drugs has been ineffective, the
narcotics crisis lingers on in the public mind and so does the temptation for
politicians to play on it. The situation has been institutionalized. 90  A
legislative body that took action to reduce narcotics penalties could expect
first, to be described as "weak on crime," and second, to be understood to
have acknowledged that narcotics are not the problem the media makes
them out to be. Either way, the politicians have placed themselves in
extremely vulnerable positions when the time for re-election comes around.
We are left with a scenario in which the only body that could create a more
rational drug policy is completely impotent to do so; this constitutes a
critical gap in governance.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO SENTENCING PROBLEMS
A. A SEMI-CLASSIFICATION OF "UNDULY" STIGMATIZED CRIMES AND
CRIMINALS
The discussion of legislative impotence above suggests that some
manner of judicial intervention-in the form of appellate sentence review
for example-would be appropriate where the courts encounter a significant
present themselves as supporters of laws that impose swifter, more severe
punishment....").
87 See SCHLOSSER, supra note 44, at 23-25 (describing the role of parenting groups in
pushing rational drug debate out of the mainstream).
88 Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 153 (2004) ("[Tlhe vast majority of voters.., see
themselves primarily as prospective victims of crime rather than as potential defendants.").
89 See Blakely, Kennedy & Kawachi, supra note 69, at 99 ("[S]ocioeconomic inequalities
in political participation lead to state policies that harm the poor.").
90 Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL. L. REv. 839, 850




gap in the efficacy of government. That is to say, judicial intervention in
the context of a particular case may make sense and raise the fewest
constitutional concerns where another branch of government lacks a
rational motive to address a problem. Such is the definition of an analysis
based upon the aptitudes of different governing bodies. When the courts
entertain a case, the courts have a rational incentive to address the matter
satisfactorily, whereas the legislature is not similarly incentivized.
This raises the question as to which crimes or criminal laws present the
judiciary with such a gap. Do all narcotics laws? Do all criminal laws, to
the extent that the legislature could be said to lack incentive to reduce any
criminal's sentence under the current climate? The subject matter of the
crime should be the most important criteria. It makes sense to include
narcotics crimes for the reasons enumerated. This Comment does not aim
to thoroughly categorize the criminal law to this end. However, the
behavior of courts is telling. Some courts have applied appellate sentence
review in other contexts, such as to heinous crimes--distinguishable, yes,
but also similar in ways that the courts take seriously.
One heinous crime that has been the subject of appellate sentence
review is assault with a deadly weapon.91 In a second California case by the
name of People v. Thomas, the statute in question imposed a six-months-to-
life sentence. The court found that the sentence violated Eighth
Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment, since other
similar or more serious crimes received less serious punishment.92 In this
sense, it is similar to the narcotics cases discussed earlier in that other
offenses were consulted in order to make an analogous judgment about
proportionality.
The key to unlocking the meaning of this decision is to answer the
question as to why the appellate court felt that that particular case warranted
rare appellate sentence review. Assault, like narcotics offenses, is a crime
that attracts a great deal of media attention. Violent criminals, much like
drug offenders, are stigmatized, and laws aimed at curbing their behavior or
punishing offenders more harshly are very common. In short, it is the
stigma attached to the crime, and the vulnerable position it leaves offenders
in, the evidence of which was the sentence itself relative to other sentences,
that made the court feel an intervention was appropriate.93 Would courts be
wise to get involved under such a "stigmatized crime" doctrine?
This is a tempting approach because it connotes well-known and
widely-discussed crimes, of which there could be no more than a handful.
91 People v. Thomas, 116 Cal. Rptr. 393 (Ct. App. 1974).
92 Id. at 400-0 1.
93 id.
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Also, there appears to be a semi-quantitative rudder to ground appellate
courts' analysis-penalties assigned to other offenses of similar moral
gravity. However, therein lies the seed of discontent. Courts have the
responsibility to determine which crimes are of a similar moral gravity.
Taking the narcotics case and the violent assault case above,94 one would
not be surprised to find individuals in favor of the lighter sentencing result
in the drug case, but seriously disapproving of the result in the assault case.
The balancing of crimes is a metaphysical endeavor with few or no guiding
principles we can agree on. Seen in this light, it would appear that such
judgments belong in the hands of the legislature. However, this conclusion
is too easily reached and dismisses much of reality.
In this situation, courts are asked to decide how to weigh the gravity of
a particular, individualized offense-not the category of offense generally,
which is the appropriate function of the legislature. This distinction is in
keeping with the general principal that the legislative body first enacts the
laws, and then the court seeks to apply the law to cases as they arise.
Typically, the legislature relies on the courts to fill in meaning as needed
where the general text of the statute does not appear to apply to the case at
hand. This complementary process relieves the legislature from the need to
unceasingly pass legislation that corrects for unforeseen circumstances. 95
By analogy, in a criminal statute, might not the general provisions fail
the principle of proportionality in a variety of circumstances? The court
could tailor the sentence in a given case to meet requirements of
proportionality. If so, then it is somewhat difficult to imagine why
appellate sentence review is so controversial. The answer may be found in
the unusual relationship between the notion of an independent judiciary and
a democratic government.
96
B. A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL ACTION: APPELLATE SENTENCE
REVIEW SERVES A COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN FUNCTION
The gap discussed above, arising from the lack of incentives for
legislatures to implement a rational narcotics policy, suggests a problem in
governmental organization recognized since the founding of the nation-the
94 Id. at 393 (dealing with assault); People v. Thomas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Ct. App. 1975)
(dealing with narcotics).
95 Adam N. Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking, 65 U. PiTT. L. REV. 545,
554 (2004) (describing judicial lawmaking powers as "functional" in application, as
distinguished from the "literal" lawmaking power of the legislature).
96 See, e.g., Johanningmeier, supra note 17, at 1126 (expressing disapproval of judicial
review powers over a legislature with democratic credentials).
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"tyranny of the majority. 97  The creation of an independent judiciary
represents the United States' attempt to check "tyrannical" popular
impulses. At a fundamental level, then, the courts exist to exert a counter-
majoritarian influence on representative government.
Appellate sentence review falls into the category of counter-
majoritarian tools that the court possesses within its arsenal, but has not
elected to exercise extensively. As a result of the common law doctrine of
non-reviewability and the tendency of courts not to practice appellate
sentence review, few of the policy considerations that such review would
implicate have been adequately addressed.98 A short list of policy questions
may include the following: (1) When is appellate sentence review
appropriate?; (2) How should a court determine that a sentence is excessive
or that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment?; and (3) How should
invalid sentences be remedied?
Appellate sentence review could be justified in any case whatsoever
under the recommendation of the American Bar Association, which came to
the conclusion that appellate sentence review was an essential part of any
rational crime policy.99 Should the scope of appellate review be as broad as
this? The answer is probably not. Appellate sentence review represents a
break with the traditional way of doing things, even if this federal tradition
does not bind the state courts. In consideration of this fact, the resort to
appellate sentence review should occur only when several factors are
present.
First, the crime itself should be stigmatized. The court should adopt a
holistic balancing test to determine whether a crime meets the standard of
stigma. This is so because a great many factors can make a particular crime
stigmatic and formulaic approaches are likely to let a few worthy crimes, or
crimes not yet considered stigmatic, slip through the net. However, the
principle factor for defining a stigmatic crime is the amount of media and
popular attention devoted to it.
Imagine a continuum. On the one end lies little or no discussion of the
crime in the relevant media or political spheres. On the other end lies an
explosion of media attention, such as that paid to illegal immigration in
many border states. 100 The latter situation warrants an approach under a
97 See Waldron, supra note 18, at 1395 (acknowledging that fear of the tyranny of the
majority pervades American political culture).
98 See Reitz, supra note 1, at 1445 (citing the lack of guiding principles due to courts'
lack of experience with meaningful sentence review).
99 AM. BAR Ass'N PROJECT, supra note 22, at 3.
100 See, e.g., Susan Bibler Coutin, Contesting Criminality: Illegal Immigration and the
Spatialization of Legality, 9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 6-7 (2005) (looking at the way
public perceptions of illegal immigrants shape the immigrants' behavior).
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stigmatic framework given the potential for hysteria; conversely, the former
scenario does not. Making determinations somewhere in the middle is the
challenge to courts. However, great political weight is rarely attached to the
larger number of criminal offenses, and courts should be able to readily
assess whether a given crime has been used to galvanize voter support or
undergird a tough on crime posturing to the point of rendering the
legislature ineffective on point.
Second, the sentence should be excessive to the point of being
shocking. That is to say, appellate courts should set cases of de minimis
excessiveness aside and focus on instances where, for example, a sentence
is excessive by a year or more rather than by a number of months. It is
unfortunate that no bright-line tests readily present themselves to guide
analysis, but it is important to stay clear of the unnecessary constitutional
problems inherent in declaring invalid as a whole a state's overall approach
to combating a category of debilitating crime. That is to say, courts should
restrict themselves to the marginal cases. Doing so will also focus more
attention on the harshness of the penalties imposed, rather than the
culpability of defendants.
The need to measure the excessiveness of a sentence arises only once
the offense in a case has been determined stigmatic, the legislature has been
found to be impotent due to political realities, and the penalty imposed has
been found shocking. The thought of measuring excessiveness will likely
raise many hackles about the courts' suitability to make this decision.
However, the courts in the cases surveyed above both utilized a similar
technique-comparing the penalty imposed with that of equivalent or
greater crimes in terms of moral gravity.l°1
This comparative approach has the benefit of supplementing subjective
analysis (determination of the moral gravity of a crime) with objective
standards (consideration of how other similarly situated individuals being
treated). The presence of an objective standard, while not essential for the
court, is welcome for the credibility it supplies. Appellate sentence review
would come under heavy fire indeed if it were thought merely to impose the
subjective valuations of the judges themselves. 102 In the scenario where the
appellate court is unable to demonstrate through comparative analysis that a
sentence is excessive, that failure should result in an extremely strong
presumption that the sentence was fair within the jurisdiction. Thus, the
objective criterion also serves to ground the judiciary in the local or state
101 In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Cal. 1974).
102 See Waldron, supra note 18 (arguing that judicial review already permits an
unacceptable amount of judicial subjectivity).
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context to ensure the decision appropriately reflects those local and state
concerns.
A finding of no excessiveness should conclude the court's inquiry.
But what if excessiveness is found? The appellate court could amend the
sentence. This was the route chosen by the courts in the cases surveyed
above.10 3 The appellate court could also remand for a sentencing hearing in
keeping with the tenor of its finding of excessiveness. It would be nonsense
for the appellate court to throw out the conviction; the sentencing concerns
are unrelated to the finding of a guilty verdict.
Remanding the decision to lower courts may appeal to some observers
because it does not bog down the appellate court with lengthy proceedings.
But there is the significant problem that the lower court may feel rudderless
in trying to determine the appropriate sentence. This is an obstacle, but not
necessarily a critical one. Presumably, in practice, appellate courts would
delineate the contours of an appropriate sentence in their decisions to
remand.
Guidance of this sort to a lower court would probably suffice to ensure
some conformity of decision-making. That said, if remanding cases were
the way to go, why bother making the appellate court go to the trouble of
outlining a sentence and delegating the authority to impose the sentence to a
lower court? Such could be described accurately as a ministerial function
for the lower court. It would appear to be more efficient to have the
appellate court simply edit the sentence itself and resolve of the matter. The
cases surveyed above offer some guidance here, as the courts edited the
sentences themselves.1
0 4
C. POTENTIAL AND AUTHORITY FOR GREATER APPLICATION OF
APPELLATE SENTENCE REVIEW
While this Comment emphasizes appellate sentence review in the
context of narcotics sentences, which are especially prone to be excessive
for reasons already discussed, a Georgia case dealing with a sex statute
perhaps best exemplifies the latent power and present day state of appellate
sentence review. 10 5 In Humphrey v. Wilson, defendant Genarlow Wilson
engaged in consensual oral sex in a hotel room with a fifteen-year-old girl
"03 See Foss, 519 P.2d 1074, 1076 (setting aside the provision that precluded the offender
from eligibility for parole); People v. Thomas, 119 Cal. Rptr. 739, 745 (Ct. App. 1975)
(amending a sentence enhancement for past narcotics felonies that precluded eligibility for
parole during the first fifteen years of a sentence); People v. Thomas, 116 Cal. Rptr. 393,
400-01 (Ct. App. 1974).
104 See supra note 103.
15 Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 2007).
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in violation of Georgia's child molestation law.10 6  The jury found the
defendant guilty; he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. 107 The
defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the offense.
10 8
The Georgia law reflects the desire of the legislature to severely punish
sex offenders. After Wilson began serving his sentence, the legislature did
in fact reduce the crime of which Wilson was convicted to a
misdemeanor.10 9 However, many people would consider even consensual
sex between minors to be undesirable and worthy of legislation. The
interesting thing to note here is that, as in narcotics cases, the behaviors
proscribed in the Georgia law do in fact receive broad condemnation, but of
a different kind and a different nature.
Sexual predators commit crimes that damage the development of
others and leave scars for years, if not a lifetime, to come." 0 Incarceration
for such a crime is hardly shocking. Teen sexual activity is a social
problem that may lead to unwanted pregnancies and frustrated lives that fall
short of potential. A great deal of rhetoric is aimed at this social problem,
but incarceration of the consenting teens is rarely one of the plausible
solutions put forward. In the case of the Georgia statute, the legislature
made a decision to pass a bill that incorporated punishment of teen sex
within the framework of an assault on sexual predators. Why? Is it likely
that state voters simply elected individuals completely out of tune with
contemporary attitudes about teen sex? No-it is practically certain that
many, if not most, of the representatives have confronted teen sex with their
own children, and few probably wished that their child, the "offender," had
been incarcerated.
More likely, the representatives saw the political ease of supporting the
bill, in contrast to the risk of speaking up for proportionate punishment, and
made the decision as a pragmatic no-brainer. The political truth is that
persons who engage in culpable conduct that attracts media attention are
subject to any punishment the legislature finds convenient-speaking up
merely comes with a label of being "soft on crime. ' 11
106 Id. at 501.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 504. This point would seem to distinguish Wilson's case from other stigmatic
cases, since the legislature demonstrated its capability to revise the law on a more rational
basis. However, Georgia's resistance to retroactively applying the 2006 amendment to
Wilson's sentence reveals the stigmatic rhetoric at play by focusing on Wilson's culpability.
'"o Michael Christianson, Statute Note, Pushing the Limits with Statutes of Limitation:
Helping Utah Adult Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse After Stogner v. California, 6 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 181, 191-92 (2004).
111 Gerald F. Uelmen, Victims' Rights in California, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
197, 199 (1992) (describing "tough on crime" and "soft on crime" as "simplistic
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However, media attention is not always consistent, and can vary
substantially between the vague discussion of a crime in the abstract to the
specifics of a particular case. As word of Wilson's conviction spread in the
national media, the defendant became a victim. The Georgia Supreme
Court heard his case in 2007, after the defendant had spent two years
behind bars. The Georgia Supreme Court found that his sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and
the defendant was released.' 12
I propose that the Georgia Supreme Court resolved this case under the
framework of appellate sentence review for stigmatic crimes outlined in this
Comment. For that framework to apply, the subject of the crime itself must
be stigmatized. In the case of Genarlow Wilson, the sex crime of child
molestation was the subject offense. The Supreme Court could rationally
conclude that sex crimes were a stigmatic offense based on the state's
stubbornness despite the recent timing of the bill's amendment 1 3 and the
administration's controversial emphasis on abstinence, the relatively large
amount of media attention given sex crimes involving children and
abduction, and the pervasive culture wars between vocal special interests in
the contemporary political climate that often turn sex-related issues into
wedge issues."
14
After the Georgia Supreme Court recognizes sex crimes as stigmatic,
the framework established above asks the Court to then consider whether
the sentence is shocking. 15 The Supreme Court had little difficulty with
labels .. creating a political climate where real reform is impossible, because political
leaders are obsessed with the fear that any rational considerations of alternatives will result
in their being labeled 'soft on crime"').
112 Wilson, 652 S.E.2d at 502.
1"3 Id. at 503 (noting that Georgia had since changed the offense of which Wilson was
convicted from a felony to a misdemeanor).
114 See Lydia S. Antoncic, A New Era in Humane Education: How Troubling Youth
Trends and a Call for Character Education Are Breathing New Life into Efforts to Educate
Our Youth About the Value of All Life, 9 ANIMAL L. 183, 193 (2003) ("The [Bush
administration's] abstinence issue is becoming ... controversial.., as it continues to gain
national attention."); Steven J. Wernick, Note, In Accordance with a Public Outcry: Zoning
Sex Offenders Through Residence Restrictions in Florida, 58 FLA. L. REv. 1147, 1153
(2006) ("[T]here is a persistent perception that every child is a potential victim to the
stranger lurking around the comer. The array of media attention directed toward sex crimes
and their perpetrators, in the form of news reports and television programming, has propelled
this perception forward and generated a climate of intolerance toward sex offenders."). For a
consideration of the view that controversial sexual matters play a role as wedge issues and
will continue to be used to polarize the voting public, see, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Gay
Marriage: Did Issue Help Re-Elect Bush?, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 2004, at Al (noting that the
issue galvanized conservative voters in the national election).
115 The court characterized its analysis thusly:
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this inquiry. The ten-year sentence caused a national outcry. Given the
public reaction, the Court could have little doubt that a large section of the
public found the sentence wildly disproportionate. That the sentence
received so much third-party attention for its shocking nature is an
important point to keep in mind.
The framework's final stage asks the Court to consider how best to
amend the sentence. In this case the Court found the shocking test met to
such a degree that the defendant's two years' of incarceration were enough
and he was set free. 16 The reaction to the Court's decision was popular and
well-received." 7  The reaction should intrigue us because the Court was
able to exercise its appellate sentence review without compromising its
integrity in the public eye. From this encouraging perspective, the case
makes it clear that appellate sentence review is not always controversial and
need not upset the balance of government power. But the more
discouraging point that has to be made is that the case was easy. How
much can we glean from it?
Describing the case as easy is simplistic. Given the popular outcry, the
Court faced a situation where reviewing the sentence promised more for the
Court's posture than deciding not to review. In effect, the Supreme Court
was charged with a mission-correct the injustice! In so doing, the media
characterized the Court's function as institutional correction, not as
institutional protest. As a result, facing scant resistance, the justices did not
have to make important separation of powers arguments in support of
appellate sentence review, to which arguments we now turn.
If a sentence does not further a legitimate penological goal, it does not 'reflect a rational
legislative judgment' .. . and a threshold showing of disproportionality has been made. If this
threshold analysis reveals an inference of gross disproportionality, a court must proceed to the
second step and determine whether the initial judgment of disproportionality is confirmed by a
comparison of the defendant's sentence to sentences imposed for other crimes within the
jurisdiction and for the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Wilson, 652 S.E.2d at 506. I propose that this framework parallels the stigmatic framework
nicely. In the first case, a determination of legislative non-functionality is made. Next, the
court applies the shocking standards and, finally, resolves the sentence's excessiveness in
comparison with penalties assigned to other offenses of similar or greater gravity.
116 Id. at 501.
117 CNN dedicated a webpage to Genarlow Wilson's case. After the decision was
handed down, headlines on the page focused on Wilson's resolution to study in college and
to be "more conservative, more alert and more appreciative." Genarlow Wilson: Plea Deal
Would Have Left Me Without a Home, CNN.cOM, http://edition.cnn.com/2007[US/law/10/
29/wilson.released/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).
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D. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The notion that greater use of appellate sentence review would violate
principles of the separation of powers is a significant obstacle to the
proposal, because it touches on sensitive issues concerning the limits that
can and should be placed on democratic will.118 It is appealing to suggest
that the legislature is the branch of government best suited to gauge the
public's attitude toward criminal offenses, and to leave it at that. However,
this argument is vulnerable because it assumes an overlap of sentencing and
lawmaking that does not exist. Sentencing is a judicial function, not a
legislative one; laws are general policy, while sentences are bound to the
facts of a particular case. Appellate sentence review does not hamper the
legislature's ability to set rational and effective crime-fighting policy; the
unavailability of sentence review does much to hamper the judicial branch's
ability to fulfill the sentencing function in a rational and efficient way. 119
The counter-argument would posit that judges are no better situated
than legislators to make determinations about the gravity of an offense, and
might in fact be adversely situated due to independence from the voting
public. One retort is that judges are better situated than either the
legislature or the voting public to weigh the culpability of the individual
offenders that come before him or her relative to one another.
Furthermore, the distinction between the legislator's ability to set
policy and the judicial exercise of appellate sentence review can be made on
an ex ante versus ex post basis. Policy decisions, such as the sentence due
for an offense, are made prior to the fact and will bind a type of conduct
based on distinguishing characteristics of a general nature. The aim of the
legislature is to penalize and deter unwanted conduct; it is not the ambition
of the legislature to generate a bill that will fit every possible scenario and
yield the appropriate result. The marginal case is most likely to produce an
excessive or cruel sentence, not the typical case.1 20  Since the legislature
addresses the typical case, does it diminish the power of the legislature if
118 Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary
Violate Criminal Defendants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1102 (2006)
(observing that state elected judges are the equivalent of politicians and that they respond to
an outraged public by producing the desired result-longer sentences-thereby raising the
question of an inappropriate intrusion of popular will into the courtroom).
119 See AM. BAR ASS'N PROJECT, supra note 22, at 3 (requiring sentence review as a part
of any rational criminal policy). The implication of the ABA's recommendation is that the
United States' criminal policy is irrational in its present form, since it lacks meaningful
sentence review.
120 See James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less is Better: Justice Stevens and
the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1656-57 (2006) (noting that Texas
joined other states in passing legislation that gives jurors the option to select a life sentence
without parole in capital cases, thereby applying their own brand of sentence review).
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the courts tailor sentences to reach appropriate results in the unanticipated,
marginal cases? Perhaps that is simply the most efficient way to allocate
power between the branches.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates greater use of appellate sentence review in
cases involving narcotics or other stigmatic crimes, or crimes for which the
perpetrator is especially susceptible to the "tyranny of the majority." Such
tyranny is especially prevalent in a jurisdiction where the popular but false
dichotomy of policy-makers as being tough on crime or soft on crime
prevails. This is so because politicians become invested in a public image
of tough law-and-order stances to the exclusion of considering interesting
and practical alternatives, out of fear that doing so will lead to a labeling
that they are weak and soft on crime. In other words, the legislators lack an
incentive to effectively legislate on this matter. The resulting gap in
effective governance is a classic example of a counter-majoritarian
dilemma, precisely the type of problem for which the courts' nature as
independent from democratic processes render them best suited to handle.
To that end, it is proposed that the courts apply a framework by which
it is first assessed whether the legislative ability to function effectively on a
given crime has been compromised. If not, then ordinary rules of
sentencing review apply. If the legislature is not functioning, however, the
court may ask whether the sentence is disproportionate to the offense. If so,
then the appellate court may measure the excessiveness of the penalty by
comparing it to the penalty imposed -for other offenses and editing the
sentence accordingly.
As to the separation of powers arguments raised, this Comment
suggests that the power to edit a sentence that was statutorily arrived at is
quite distinct from the legislator's power to set policy. From this vantage
point, appellate sentence review is complementary to the legislative
process. Appellate sentence review also improves the efficiency of the
legislature, which need spend less time tailoring bills to every conceivable
scenario-a lengthy and tedious endeavor unworthy of our policy-makers.
The introduction to this Comment identified four issues that a move to
greater appellate sentence review would have to address in order to be
effective and principled. The first of these asked whether such appellate
review takes power from the legislature in an unconstitutional way. The
answer is no, for two important reasons. The first reason is that the
decision whether or not to practice appellate sentence review is within the
discretion and competency of the courts. The common law doctrine of non-
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reviewability is judge-made law, not statutory law. 12 1 The second reason is
that the judicial function of appellate review is distinguishable from the
lawmaking power of the legislature. As noted above, the key to
understanding this distinction is to observe that an appellate sentencing
decision applies only to the facts at hand in a given case, and not to the
conduct generally proscribed. This Comment has taken care to show that
appellate sentence review in fact complements and facilitates the legislative
function by addressing marginal circumstances that would dramatically
increase the transaction costs of completing a bill. Appellate review of
criminal sentences functions in an identical way, consistent with the judicial
purpose.
The second issue concerned the degree to which courts possess
manageable standards by which to conduct appellate sentence review. One
point of difficulty here is that appellate sentence review necessarily requires
that judges make subjective decisions. Judges must evaluate the magnitude
122of a given offense and then decide upon a sentence that is proportionate.
In response to this cause for concern, this Comment recommends a
framework for judicial decision-making that blends subjective and objective
criteria. Highlighting the objective trigger feature, judges would have to
determine that a crime category was stigmatic vis-d-vis the citizens of the
jurisdiction before sentencing review. Objective criteria will also guide
judges in arriving at an appropriate sentence, by requiring a sentence in line
with other offenses of similar gravity. The assessment of an offender's
culpability in an individual case remains within the subjective scope of the
judge. However, judges are better situated than legislators to make such
calls, by the nature of their profession and expertise.
The third issue is the slippery-slope fear that courts will abuse the
power of appellate review by editing sentences that are not properly
excessive. Undoubtedly, an unprincipled expansion of appellate sentence
review would undercut uniformity and consistency in the law. 123 The chaos
inherent in the approach would likely drive some neighboring local
jurisdictions into fairly different approaches to common problems, which
could raise issues regarding an individual's ability to know their conduct
121 See Reitz, supra note 1.
122 The extent to which this exercise of discretion parallels the exercise of judicial power
in the common law era, where the doctrine of non-reviewability prevailed, complicates the
argument that appellate sentence review aggrandizes judicial power at the expense of the
legislative branch of government.
123 See Adam Lamparello, Introducing the "Heartland Departure," 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 643, 687 (2004) (describing the novel and well-regarded Minnesota appellate
sentence review system, which tempers great appellate discretion against narrow and
principled grounds for departure at the trial court level).
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was criminal. 124 First of all, that is the very nature of judicial federalism.
Secondly, however, no reason exists to think that the judiciary would
expand appellate sentence review in an unprincipled fashion. The historical
pattern of judicial restraint regarding appellate review indicates strongly
that it is not a power judges will rush to utilize and abuse.
Finally, there remains the issue of whether appellate sentence review
unfairly deprives the citizenry of its ability to voice disapproval of conduct.
The citizenry's ability to do this relies on its ability to elect the policy-
makers who write the laws. Appellate sentence review is irrelevant to this
process. Under such review, legislators still write the laws that proscribe
conduct, not judges. In conclusion, the effect of greater appellate review
will not be that judges will turn some criminals into non-criminals by virtue
of idiosyncratic processes, but rather it will, to at least some extent, ensure
that punishment in marginal cases is proportionate to the offender's
culpability.
124 But see Christina N. Davilas, Note, Prosecutorial Sentence Appeals: Reviving the
Forgotten Doctrine in State Law as an Alternative to Mandatory Sentencing Laws, 87
CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1283 (2002) ("[T]he overriding emphasis ... on uniformity is often
at the expense of individual fairness.").
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